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The sociologist Max Weber observed that theultimately possible attitudes to life areirreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never
be brought to a ﬁnal conclusion. Nevertheless, blasphemy
law, which has been a venerable offence for several
centuries in English law, and which has durably protected
Christian values, has now been repealed, practically
irretrievably, because it is allegedly demoded in both policy
and principle. The law abrogating blasphemy law is section
79 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008,
which received Royal Assent on May 8, 2008. Section
153(2)(d) of that Act provides for its provisions to come
into force two months after Royal Assent. At the time of
writing, this enforcement date has only very recently been
reached.
Although blasphemy law has now been rendered obsolete,
it was once a key plank in the English criminal law which
has been much inﬂuenced by Christianity. Moreover,
blasphemy law has acted in the past as a law of
constitutional importance for the enforcement of public
morality, recognising Christ as the Kulturheros of western
civilisation, and protecting his image and theosophy
accordingly. In affording him and his religious creed
particular iconic protection, the law in effect attempted to
insulate his reputation and beliefs from defamation. With
the passage of time, only ill-tempered or scurrilous attacks
on Christ’s image and teachings formed the actus reus of the
crime, but the mens rea of the offence was always minimal,
and a matter of strict liability: it was never required that
intention to blaspheme was necessary for the offence to be
committed. All that was required for a conviction was that
Christ and his religion had in fact been viliﬁed by the
defendant in an unseemly way. The reasons for prohibiting
blasphemy eventually became secularised and blasphemy
law was used to keep public order, primarily, highlighting
again the requirement that the criticism of Christianity
needed to be other than sober for the offence to be
properly constituted.
It is also signiﬁcant that, throughout its history, blasphemy
law’s protection was claimed to relate to Anglicanism
alone, so the Virgin Mary, for example, as a Catholic
symbol, arguably fell outside its terms. However, this
theological point is neither certain nor compelling because
in “high church” Anglicanism the Virgin plays a very
crucial part in everyday worship. What is indisputable,
though, is that the law of blasphemy adversely affected
freedom of expression throughout its progress in England,
hence why the Americans refused to use it, since it would
have infringed the right to free speech enshrined in the
First Amendment, a provision that to them has itself
acquired almost religious signiﬁcance. In England,
blasphemy law has now been superseded, in effect, by
incitement to religious hatred, in 2006 legislation that
came into force on October 1, 2007, namely the Racial
and Religious Hatred Act. Muslims had never been
protected under the Public Order Act 1936 because this
legislation extended only to races, so religious minorities
were denied parity of protection. The 2006 Act has ﬁlled
this lacuna but, like blasphemy law, is still, in the minds of
some, an undue restriction on free speech. There is also
always the intractable legal problem of how to deﬁne a
“religion” for protection purposes. The shift in protective
priorities is more important than it might at ﬁrst appear
and will be referred to in this short article after the
elaboration of the historical signiﬁcance of blasphemy law
is complete.
A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF BLASPHEMY LAW IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Such was once the importance of the Christian religion in
England that it was from early times illegal to produce
blasphemous statements, orally or in writing. Blasphemy
included the denial of the truth of the Christian religion,
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the Bible, the Book of Common Prayer or the existence of
the Christian God. Protecting undifferentiated “society”
from any event of blasphemy was to ensure the internal
tranquillity of the kingdom as much as to prevent the
tainting of the image of Christ. It was supposed that the
whole of society would lose its basic integrity if blasphemy
was permitted, but it was also acknowledged that decorous
formal discourse on the fundamentals of any religion could
not constitute the offence. The law was aimed at the
riotous mode or even potential of the utterance. Civil
disorder today is unlikely to result from blasphemy relating
to the Christian religion, but it is important to note that
anti-Islamic utterances could easily lead to breaches of the
peace in contemporary England, so the law has recently
evolved in a different way to accommodate Muslims, as
speciﬁed above.
Somewhat unconscionably, when the traditional blasphemy
offence became utilised in more modern times, in the case
of Lemon [1979] AC 617, for example, illegal blasphemy
was deemed to result in accordance with a much less
violence-based rationale, attenuating one implicit reason
for the offence that rested on the projected ill-deﬁned but
probable volatile and hostile reaction to the blasphemous
statement. In the aforementioned case, an allegedly
blasphemous poem plus illustration in the newspaper Gay
News was the target of prosecution at the instigation of
family-values campaigner, the late Mary Whitehouse. The
prosecution succeeded based on the offensiveness of the
material, and it was never suggested that that material had
to provoke violence to come within the ambit of blasphemy
law, which was an unwelcome step for those concerned
about the human right of free speech. The contentious
material in Lemon had been published in a newspaper for
gay and bisexual people but the House of Lords ignored
the fact that its selective context was relevant. It also failed
to investigate the intentions behind the material which
could be described as “art”. It simply applied strict liability.
This is out of tandem with the postmodern emphasis on
respecting all sub-sets of society, including artists and
writers. It took the law back to the values of its mediaeval
roots. There had, moreover, been no blasphemy
prosecution for over 60 years before the Lemon imbroglio.
The law was to be tested again in more recent times in the
case of Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Choudhury
[1991] 1 QB 429, which can be referred to as the Rushdie
case. A summons was sought against Salman Rushdie and
his publishers for an alleged blasphemous libel, inter alia, by
the publication of Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses. A
summons was refused at both ﬁrst instance and Divisional
Court levels. Both courts concurred in stating that
blasphemy law only applied to the protection of the
Christian religion and could not be extended to protect
Islam. This was evidently in ignorance of the pertinent
hierological consideration that Christ is recognised as a
prophet (if not the Messiah) in Islam. In addition, neither
court considered the culturally specialised position of art (a
novel) in the blasphemy context, and other relevant
questions. Is it possible to blaspheme through characters in
a work of art or does blasphemy law only apply to literal, as
opposed to symbolic, ﬁctive statements? In a religiously-
plural society, can a law protecting only one religion be fair
and justiﬁable? Should blasphemy law be a strict liability
offence or should it, for example, include an assessment of
whether Rushdie, or any other creative writer in a similar
position, knew the probable effect of his words, even
though their locus was a solely artistic context?
In 1985, the Law Commission had recommended that
blasphemy law should be abolished. The two
commissioners against such a radical step simpliciter
suggested that blasphemy law should be replaced by a new
offence designed to proscribe any acts that were deemed to
outrage religious feelings. The Racial and Religious Hatred
Act 2006 broadly amounts to implementing the salient part
of their proposals. Regarding the majority decision, it has
taken until July 2008 to remove blasphemy law from the
common law as the Law Commission instructed in the
mid-1980s. This delay is no shock; neither is the ultimate
abrogation: blasphemy law has been only rarely prosecuted
in England, and, when it was eventually repealed, its state
was anachronistic, and moderately vestigial.
UNITED KINGDOM BLASPHEMY LAW IN
AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Blasphemy has appeared as a central issue before the
European Court of Human Rights. Although the cases
involving the United Kingdom directly are few, they are
seminally signiﬁcant. The European Commission of
Human Rights afﬁrmed the legitimacy of operating a
national blasphemy law in X and Y v United Kingdom, which
was the international extension of the Lemon case [EHRR
123 1983]. It did so even though the elements of such
offences are usually relatively unclear, and the use of such
crimes haphazard, and the results of their application
inconsistent. In Choudhury v United Kingdom, which was the
international extension of the Rushdie case (12 HRLJ 172
1991), the application contending that English law was
prejudicial against Islam was declared inadmissible by the
Commission as manifestly ill-founded because there was
no positive obligation on states, under European
Convention on Human Rights law, to protect all religious
sensibilities. These cases are interesting because, by using
its margin of appreciation, the Strasbourg organs of the
Convention have allowed the contracting states to apply
their own blasphemy laws without Convention review of a
thorough kind, which is arguably a dereliction of duty.
Instead of revising unsatisfactory blasphemy law in a
proactive way, the Strasbourg organs have been content to
give the local states a free rein, and no remedial assistance,
even with such an opaque and sometimes arbitrarily-
applied law. It is unusual for the Convention, as a “living
instrument”, to be developmentally behind national
initiatives regarding such law, since the duty of the26
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Convention organs that apply it is to secure decisions that
are in harmony with the prevailing current social, moral
and political consciousness of the people it is meant to
protect.
There is now the anomaly that blasphemy law has been
abolished in the United Kingdom but is still very much
extant in European Convention jurisprudential doctrine.
In the United Kingdom case of Wingrove v United Kingdom
(1997 24 EHRR 1), which was adjudicated upon by the
European Court of Human Rights, and which resulted in
Nigel Wingrove failing in his attempt to reverse a local
decision that had found his video-ﬁlm, Visions of Ecstasy,
potentially blasphemous, the international court’s decision
was to simply reafﬁrm without appropriate analysis the
local refusal to give the video-ﬁlm a certiﬁcate, so that the
consequence that it could not be distributed and shown
remained insubstantially reviewed. It also appears that,
paradoxically, the organs of the Convention, notably the
court, now have a less liberal approach to artistic freedom
than the United Kingdom itself, whose decisions the
Convention organs are conscientiously bound to
reappraise, and test for legitimacy, in relation to the
fundamental rights that those organs are speciﬁcally
designed to protect.
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The operation of blasphemy law in England historically
preserved a reverence for the sociologically-indigenous, if
not completely native, Anglican religious culture in
England, centred on widespread, and nearly uniform,
Christian belief. In the era of postmodernism, the pre-
eminence of such endemic spiritual values in the United
Kingdom has been reduced in part following a gradual
political reappraisal of our now religiously-diverse national
society. A central concern has focused on the vibrant faith
of Muslims, and the need for the protection of Islam from
viliﬁcation. Emphasis has thus shifted from one God to
another, and the preservation of law and order in a
religiously-plural society has featured strongly as a
motivating factor in bringing about the Racial and
Religious Hatred Act 2006 primarily to protect Muslims.
Some commentators of a conservative disposition resent
the displacement of Christianity for another faith as a
matter of political and legal priority. However, this
recalcitrant approach does not accommodate the
importance of realpolitik. Faced with a potentially volatile
situation given the stark reality of terrorism, it is perhaps
politically, and thereafter legally, wise to try to
accommodate peaceably a possibly inﬂammatory
confrontation between more traditional Christianity-based
religious values and those that are somewhat alien to a
number of United Kingdom citizens but which are strongly
adhered to and strenuously vocalised by a religious
minority. There is arguably a sensible sacriﬁce of the
Christian dominance in British affairs for the promotion of
a more eclectic social reality’s various forms of personal
religious identiﬁcation.
However, this tendency has been promoted by the Blairite
fostering of multi-culturalism and its logical partner
political correctness, both of which have been founded on
sociological misassumptions, and which have contributed
to the suppression of free speech, a democratic value which
the organs applying the European Convention on Human
Rights purport to uphold as cardinal. What Christian
conservatives now discern in contemporary Britain is the
lessening of one religion’s legal support in favour of
another’s, even though it is far from axiomatic that one
faith’s religious rights or freedoms should increasingly
prevail over any other’s, or prevail over the right to free
speech. They would contend that such dramatic though
stealthily incremental changes should be brought about in
a politically overt and very well-reasoned way to the total
satisfaction of all members of the national community.
Nevertheless, our legal policy-makers are obliged to take an
ideologically-neutral, pragmatic and syncretic course
regarding a lamentably complex and controversial matrix
of virtually irreconcilable competing interests; and, as Isiah
Berlin opined, the world that we encounter in ordinary
experience is one in which we are faced by choices equally
absolute, the realisation of some of which must inevitably
mean the sacriﬁce of others.
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